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The Forgotten Dinner Guest:

The "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt"

Standard in a Motion for a Judgment

of Acquittal in a Federal Bench Trial

Jared Kneitelt

Abstract

In comparison to civil trials, criminal trials are decided on more stringentstandardsofproof However, motionsforjudgmentofacquittal in criminal non-jury trials are currently decided on a mere legal sufficiency standard as opposed to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. This Article examines the lack ofreasoning and uniformity in deciding these motions as well as the potential dangers and injustices posed to a defendant by applying a lower standard. Through an examination of both domestic andforeign law, the author argues for the

application ofthe "beyond a reasonable doubt "standard when determining motions for judgment of acquittal in criminal non-jury trials.

Welcome to the Dinner Party: Introduction

The standard for judging a civil trial is lower than the standard for

judging guilt in a criminal trial, and there is no jury in a non-jury trial.

Somehow-despite these two very obvious conclusions-the nineteenth

century standard for determining a motion for a directed verdict in a civil

jury trial is still applied to our modem motion for a judgment of acquittal

in a criminal non-jury trial.

In a criminal trial, at the close of the government's case-in-chief, the

defense may make a motion for a judgment of acquittal on one or more

offenses charged.' If the motion is unsuccessful and the defense calls

a case, the defense may make another motion for ajudgment of acquittal

at the close of its case.This Article concerns only the motion at the end

of the government's case. At present, the motion will succeed only if the

government has not presented legally sufficient' evidence of all the

elements of the particular offense or offenses.

This Article discusses why, in a non-jury trial, the "beyond a reasonable

doubt" standard should be applied-instead of merely the legal

sufficiency standard-when the bench considers a motion for ajudgment

of acquittal. Not knowing whether the government has proven-in the

judge's mind-the defendant's guilt before inviting the defendant to call

a case actually militates against the presumption of innocence, the

assurance that the government discharges its burden, and the defendant's

right to remain silent.

This Article shows that the jurisprudence in the United States

improperly cites, for the standard for determining whether to grant or

deny a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a non-jury trial, either the

standard in a jury trial or the standard for appellate review. This Article

examines the historical (lack of) development of the motion for a

judgment of acquittal and the perceived constitutional preclusion against

the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Namely, the bench-as the

arbiter of law-cannot usurp a defendant's Sixth Amendment protection

to be tried on the facts by a jury of his peers.' Of course, in a non-jury

trial, the bench is both the arbiter of law and fact-finder;' hence, there

is no Sixth Amendment preclusion.

At present, there is no rule in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

explicitly governing a motion for ajudgment of acquittal in a bench trial.

Is it Rule 236 ("Jury or Nonjury Trial") or Rule 29' ("Motion for a

Judgment of Acquittal [in a Jury Trial]") that governs the motion?

Although district court judges in almost all of the reported decisions

assume Rule 29 governs, there are several cases in which district court

judges have turned to Rule 23 as the governing statute.' Further, even

among the authors of treatises on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

there is disagreement as to what Rule governs.' Wright's Federal

Practice and Procedure discusses a motion for a judgment of acquittal

in a bench trial under Rule 29.o Yet Moore's Federal Practice states,

"Rule 29 has no real application when a case is tried by the court since

the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal.""

This Article concludes by proposing a new Rule 29(e) to resolve this

ambiguity and to make clear that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard

is the standard that should be employed in determining a motion for

a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial.

I. By Invitation Only: Respondez S'il Vous Plait

A criminal defendant is not guilty unless proven guilty; the government

bears the burden of proving the criminal defendant guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt; " and the government (not the defendant) must

introduce evidence sufficient to persuade the fact-finder, beyond a

reasonable doubt, ofthe defendant's guilt.14 Thus, ifthe government does

not introduce evidence to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt, then the defendant is not guilty.

At the conclusion of the government's case, the government's case

will presumably-and in almost all circumstances-be at its highest. If

the government has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt after

the presentation of its evidence, when will it ever be able to prove its case

beyond a reasonable doubt? This begs the very simple question: If the

defendant is not guilty at the conclusion of the government's case-inchief,

why should the defendant be "invited" to call a defense?

Although the government may have presented legally sufficient

evidence of the offenses charged, the judge still may not find at the close

of the government's case that the government proved its case beyond a

reasonable doubt. For example, the judge may find the accounts of the

government witnesses to be unworthy of belief (either alone or in

combination) or circumstantial evidence presented to be too circumspect

to sustain a conviction. As always, the government must prove its case

beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden is without the assistance of any

defense evidence (including the defendant's testimony)."

Effectively, "inviting" the defendant to call a defense case-despite

the uncertainty of whether the government has proved its case beyond

a reasonable doubt at the close of its case and whether the judge would

have acquitted the defendant of an offense charged-reduces the govemment's

burden at that stage. This "invitation" to the defendant to call

defense witnesses or for the defendant to testify on his own behalf

militates against the government's obligation to prove its case. Such an

invitation should be correctly considered as not only a reduction of the

government's burden (and therefore impermissible burden shifting) but

also a violation of due process.'

Elevating the government's burden at the motion for a judgment of

acquittal stage to beyond a reasonable doubt actually strengthens the

presumption that the defendant is not guilty and properly holds the

government to its burden. This strengthens the requirement that the

government prove its case based solely on its own evidence and without

the assistance of the introduction of a defense case.

1I. The Forgotten Dinner Guest:

Historical Development of the

Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal

The motion for ajudgment of acquittal in criminal suits evolved from

its counterpart in civil procedure. Federally, in the late 1700s, civil

judges could withdraw a civil case from ajury and decide the case; then,

the common law motion for non-suit came; and finally, in the midnineteenth

century, the civil motion for a directed verdict emerged. 7

"The motion for judgment of acquittal in criminal cases came still later

and was probably influenced by these earlier developments in the civil

trial."" "The early cases directing acquittal did so without citing any

authority but apparently assumed such power was inherent in thejudge's

role as presiding officer."' 9

Indeed, Moore's Federal Practice states that Rule 29 ("Motion for

a Judgment of Acquittal" in ajury trial) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure was modeled on Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.20 "Thus, a motion for acquittal [in a jury trial] is equivalent

to a motion for a directed verdict (now called 'judgment as a matter of

law' under Civil Rule 50), or judgment notwithstanding the verdict

(judgment n.o.v.) under pre-Rules practice." 2 1

However, there still remains no legislation specifically directed

towards a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a criminal bench trial.

This is due to legislative oversight based, seemingly, on the mere

importation of the standards employed in a civil jury trial into a criminal

non-jury trial without appropriate consideration for the defendant's

exposure to a deprivation of his liberty, his right to remain silent, the

government's burden ofproving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt rather than by a preponderance, and the presumption of the

defendant's innocence.

III. The Head of the Table:

The Prevailing Legal Sufficiency Standard

The standard for judging a motion for a judgment of acquittal-in a

jury trial at least-is based on Burks v. United States." "The prevailing

rule has long been that a district judge is to submit a case to the jury if

the evidence and inferences therefrom most favorable to the prosecution

would warrant thejury's finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt."23 "Even the trial court, which has heard the testimony of witnesses

first hand, is not to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility

of witnesses when it judges the merits of a motion for acquittal."24 This

view is accepted on the Sixth Amendment right that a defendant be tried

by a jury of his peers. In jury trials, the court cannot substitute its

judgment for that of the jury.25 To do so would usurp the power of the

jury and violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee to be tried by one's

peers26 as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process

protections.

To date, however, the Supreme Court has not considered the standard

on a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a non-jury trial. This might

be because esteemed and erudite practitioners have effectively written

off considering the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in bench trials

and, as such, the issue has not reached the Supreme Court. For example,

Section 467 of Wright's Federal Practice and Procedure states, "A

motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's

evidence in a case tried to the court is considered by the same standard

as in ajury case."29 However, none of the cases Wright relies on for this

proposition in Section 467 are on point.

IV. The Unwelcome Guest:

When Wright Is Wrong

For support, Wright cites United States v. Salman,o United States v.

Pierce, 3 ' United States v. Magallon-Jimenez, 32 United States v. Carter,"

and UnitedStates v. Stubler34-none ofwhich were decided by the United

States Supreme Court. Salman involved a pre-trial dismissal of an

indictment." Pierce involved the test to be applied in appellate review"

of the sufficiency of evidence after a trial, jury or bench, and quoted

Jackson v. Virginia for the appellate standard." Thus, Pierce did not

concern a determination by the trial court on a motion for acquittal."

Both Magallon-Jimenez and Carter held that, in both jury and bench

trials, "there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the [government], any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt."" As with Pierce, Magallon-Jimenez and Carter

concerned the appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence and did

not relate to a determination of a motion for acquittal at trial level.40

Out of those five cases, Stubler was the only one that happened to be

a bench trial.4' In Stubler, the defendant moved for a judgment of

acquittal after he was convicted.42 The district court held that "Rule 29

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows for a motion for

judgment of acquittal[, and] [t]he standard the court must apply is

whether 'the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction."" Further,

the district court held "this standard remains the same [even in] a non-jury

trial."' In a surprise demonstration of a lack of understanding of the

standard-Stublerc ited civil case law regarding the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act to support that holding.4 5

Wright's Federal Practice and Procedure demonstrates-by its citation

to these inapposite cases-that it has not appropriately analyzed the

jurisprudence in making its assertion that the standard in a bench trial is

the same as in ajury trial. None of these cases concern a trial-level determination

of a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial at the

conclusion of the government's evidence. Thus, Wright has propounded

a baseless proposition on a mere cursory examination, preventing a

proper analysis of the standard. A more thorough examination is

warranted.

V. A Nostalgic Affair:

Let Us Go Back to Camp

In the United States, there are only three cases found to date in which

the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was discussed in a bench trial:

United States v. Camp,46 United States v. Laikin,4 and United States v.

Cascade Linen Supply Corp. of New Jersey.8

In Camp, a two-defendant case tried before a district judge, a motion

for ajudgment of acquittal was made after the close of the government's

evidence and before either defendant put on a case.49 The court expressly

considered whether the standard on the motion should be "whether the

evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction" and held, "logically,"

that standard meant whether the government's evidence proved the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.o According to the court,

if the government did not prove the defendant guilty and the case were

to proceed, continuing with the case

would put upon the defendant the risk that by his own evidence, as by

testimony produced on cross-examination, he might supply the evidence

which convinces the trier of fact of his guilt, where absent such evidence

the trier of fact would not be so convinced. To subject the defendant in a

criminal case to such a risk would be contrary to the principles by which the

criminal law has developed in [the United States]. It would in effect require

the defendant to assist in providing a vital element of the evidence which

convicts him."

Thus, Camp allowed for a coordinated effort of (1) the presumption of

innocence, (2) the government's evidentiary burden of proving the

defendant guilty (if it can), and (3) the defendant's right to remain silent

to protect the defendant from conviction."

While Camp's reasoning appears sensible, some courts have expressly

rejected the Camp logic. In Laikin, the defendant in a bench trial

requested the court to consider whether, on his motion for a judgment

of acquittal, the government's evidence proved him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. The Laikin court, citing the Seventh Circuit case of

United States v. Feinberg5,4 held that the correct standard is taking the

government's evidence in the light or aspect most favorable to the

government." The Feinberg" court, in making its holding, cited Glasser

v. United States,57 United States v. Velasco," and United States v.

DeNiro.9 However, Glasser, Velasco, and DeNiro each refer to the

standard of appellate review.60

United States v. Cascade Linen Supply Corp. of New JerseyP' similarly

declined to follow Camp.62 The defendants in a bench trial moved

forjudgments of acquittal after the close of the government's evidence.

Camp was not followed in Cascade Linen because the district judge

held-without citing any authority-that determining whether the government

proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of the

government's case would "severely impair the orderly disposition of the

issues."" The judge also held, again without citing any authority, that

determining the motion using the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard

"would be tantamount to submitting the evidence to the trier of the facts

twice. To this defendants are not entitled."65

The judge further indicated, without discussion, that "[he was] unable

to understand [the] defendants' contentions that the presumption of their

innocence and their right to remain silent and offer no proof [were] in

some way diminished or impaired by [his] ruling."6 From the language

and tone in Cascade Linen, it appears the judge was eager to convict the

defendants. Indeed, after the defendants' respective motions for judgment

of acquittal were denied, the defendants rested.' They were then

convicted.68

Herein lies the problem. The court can readily deny a motion for a

judgment of acquittal. Upon this denial, the defendant is still left to

speculate and guess whether the government satisfied its burden-on the

government's evidence-of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. Thus, not knowing whether the government has discharged

its burden leaves the presumption of innocence and the defendant's

right to remain silent in competition with the government's

obligation to discharge its burden when, in fact, these three aims should

be cooperating with one another.

VI. Pass the Salt:

The International Tribunals-An Exercise

in Impermissible Burden Shifting

As a comparative study, consider that the proceedings before international

war crimes tribunals are bench trials." Although in a number of

instances the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was argued by

defense counsel on a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of

the government's case,70 the use of the legal sufficiency standard became

settled law. Unfortunately, this was without the benefit of any real

analysis.

The Appeals Chamber Judgement in Prosecutor v. Jelisid" is the

leading case among the international tribunals" for use of the legal

sufficiency standard in determining a motion for a judgment of

acquittal-known as Rule 98 biS73-at the close of the prosecution's

evidence.

The Appeals Chamber inJelisid followed74 its prior Appeals Chamber

Judgement in Prosecutor v. Delalid," which in turn cited the Appeals

Chamber Judgement in Prosecutor v. Tadie," the Appeals Chamber

Judgement in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,n and the Trial Chamber's

"Decision on Motion for Acquittal" in Prosecutor v. Kunara78 for

support.

However, those portions of Aleksovski and Tadid referred to by the

Delalid Appeals Chamber Judgement concern the standard of appellate

review in determining whether a trial chamber's factual finding can

withstand appellate scrutiny-that is, legal sufficiency.79 As such, Tadid

and Aleksovski are incorrectly cited by Delalid for the proposition that

the standard a trial court sitting without a jury should use to determine

a motion for a judgment of acquittal is also legal sufficiency."

The Trial Chamber's "Decision on Motion for Acquittal" in Prosecutor

v. Kunara6 held--citing the Trial Chamber's "Decision on Defence

Motions for Judgement of Acquittal" in Prosecutor v. Kordi8 '-that the

appropriate test to be applied on a motion for a judgment of acquittal

"was not whether there was evidence which satisfied the Trial Chamber

beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused (as the defence in

that case had argued), but rather it was whether there was evidence on

which a reasonable Trial Chamber could convict." 82

All things considered, the Trial Chamber in Kunaral did its best not

to impugn the prior jurisprudence on the issue. Thus, Kunarad, shifting

the burden of proof off the shoulders of the prosecution, noted-without

citing any authority-that

[i]f the Trial Chamber were entitled to weigh questions of credit generally

when determining whether a judgment of acquittal should be entered, and

if it found that such a judgment was not warranted, the perception would

necessarily be created (whether or not it is accurate) that the Trial Chamber

had accepted the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses as credible. Such

a consequence would then lead to two further perceptions: (1) that the

accused will bear at least an evidentiary onus to persuade the Trial Chamber

to alter its acceptance of the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, and

(2) that the accused will be convicted if he does not give evidence himself.

He would virtually be required to waive the right given to him by the

Tribunal's Statute to remain silent.83

An analysis ofKordi--the case spawning the seminal misunderstanding

of the proper application of a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the

international tribunals-is thus warranted.

First, the Trial Chamber in Kordid seemed satisfied that because other

trial chambers at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia were using a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt,

using a lower standard was the appropriate thing to do." Without any

analysis, the Trial Chamber indicated that "[i]mplicit in Rule 98 bis

proceedings is the distinction between the determination made at the

halfway stage of the trial, and the ultimate decision on the guilt of the

accused to be made at the end of the case, on the basis of proof beyond

a reasonable doubt."" The Trial Chamber failed to provide any basis or

reasoning for that distinction.

Next, the Kordid Trial Chamber looked to the Trial Chamber's

"Decision on Defence Motion to Dismiss Charges" in Prosecutor v.

Tadid," the Trial Chamber's "Order on the Motions to Dismiss the

Indictment at the Close of the Prosecutor's Case" in Prosecutor v.

Delali6," the Trial Chamber's "Decision of Trial Chamber I on the

Defence Motion to Dismiss" in Prosecutor v. Blaikid," and the Trial

Chamber's "Decision on Motion for Withdrawal ofthe Indictment against

the accused Vlatko Kupregki6" in Prosecutor v. Kupregkid."

The Trial Chamber in Tadid merely held-without citing any

authority-that, because it would ultimately determine whether each

count was proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the conclusion of the

entire case, it would only determine whether the evidence presented was

legally sufficient."o

In Delalid, the Trial Chamber held that a motion for judgment of

acquittal will be denied if, "as a matter of law, there is evidence before

it relating to each of the offences in question for the accused persons to

be invited to make their defence."9' There was no analysis as to the

foundations for this principle nor did this decision cite any jurisprudence.

After citing Tadi6 and Delalid, the Trial Chamber in Blakd.W held:

CONSIDERING that, on these legal foundations, based on a strict application

of the spirit and letter of the Rules, the Trial Chamber limits the review

of the Motion:

[1] in fact: to the mere hypothesis that the Prosecutor omitted to provide

the proof for one of its counts;

[2] in law: to the mere hypothesis that the Prosecution failed to show a

serious prima facie case in support of its claims.

That decision was made without any legal analysis as to the foundations

for this principle nor did the decision cite any jurisprudence for that

Holding.

Lastly, the Trial Chamber in Kupregkid merely referred to the test

enunciated in Tadid and dismissed the motion to withdraw the indictment

because the Trial Chamber was of the opinion that there was "evidence

as to each count charged in the indictment, which were it to be accepted

by [the] Trial Chamber, could [have] lawfully support[ed] [the] conviction.""

Other than referring to Tadi6, the Kupreikid Trial Chamber did

not provide any legal support for that standard.

Kordid then examined the practice in five domestic jurisdictions-

England and Wales,94 Canada," Australia," the United States, 97 and

Spain 9 8-and found "the test that is applied on motions for acquittal at

the end of the Prosecution's case is not the high standard of proof beyond

[a] reasonable doubt. 9 However, the practice referred to in England and

Wales, the United States, and Spain is in relation tojury trials, not bench

trials.'o As explained above, the low legal sufficiency standard is used

in jury trials because the judge is precluded from usurping the factfinder's

role. As such, the jury trial practice in these jurisdictions

provides Kordid no support. Next, Australian practice allows for ajudge

to acquit a defendant after the close of the prosecution's case'o' and is

in direct contradistinction to Kordid.

Finally, Canadian practice is the lone exception that does provide some

support for Kordid's proposition. However, in Canada-per statutory

requirement-the fact-finder can only render a verdict after the defendant

declares, after the prosecution's evidence, whether the defendant intends

to call a defense case (and upon such an affirmative declaration, after

hearing the defense evidence).102 Notably, there is no such requirement

in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the international tribunals nor

in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the United States. Consequently,

Kordid's citation to Canadian procedure does not support

Kordid's proposition.

Ultimately, what happened at the international level was that a meager

legal analysis emanating from the domestic practice in jury trials was

applied to the motion for a judgment of acquittal in non-jury trials. Of

course, the jurisprudence demonstrates worry that the court would usurp

thejury's function and, as such, would allow only for a court's determination

as to legal sufficiency on a motion for ajudgment of acquittal. This

led to a fundamental misunderstanding of how such a motion should be

decided in non-jury trials and a failure to recognize that it is impossible

for trial judges to usurp the fact-finder's function because the trial judges

themselves are the fact-finders.

Further propounding this misunderstanding was (1) the misapplication

of the standard of appellate review (as in Tadid and Aleksovski) as the

standard for a trial court's determination, (2) reliance on a "consistent

pattern" in the jurisprudence of solely a legal sufficiency standard

(although this pattern developed without any forethought),' and (3) a

demurrer to the trial chambers' ultimate responsibility of determining

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of the trial. What remains

is a very low hurdle for the prosecution to meet for a motion for a

judgment of acquittal to be denied. Thus, "since the denial of such a

motion is, in no sense, an indication of the view of the Chamber as to the

guilt of the accused on any charge, little meaningful guidance is provided

to the accused in connection with his defence case.""

As highlighted in Kunara6, the jurisprudence implicitly prefers-in

attempts to avoid the twin perceptions that the accused has to persuade

the trial chamber "to alter its acceptance of the credibility of the prosecution's

witnesses" and that "the accused will be convicted if he does not

give evidence himself'-the defense to call a case instead of holding the

prosecution to its evidentiary burden of proving the defendant guilty. 05

It should be the opposite. The government should be held to its

burden. If, and only if, the government has satisfied its burden ofproving

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may then

choose to waive his right to silence. Indeed, if the trial chamber finds

that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the government

has discharged its burden.

VII. The Invitee: The Proposed Rule 29(e)-

"Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal,

Nonjury Trial"

To remedy the problems previously discussed, the author proposes

the following addition to Rule 29:

(e) Nonjury Trial. After the government closes its evidence, the

court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal

of any offense on the ground that the government did not prove that

the defendant is guilty of such offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Note, with this proposed rule, the defendant may-but is not required

to-make a motion for a judgment of acquittal. Further note that the

language in the proposed Rule 29(e) would require the court, upon such

a motion, to make a decision-without reservation-on the motion.

Of course, if acquitted on one or more counts, double jeopardy

attaches. If the bench indicates, upon decision of the motion, there will

be a conviction on one or more counts, the defendant may elect to call

a case and may elect to testify. The proposed rule does not include the

prospect for a defendant to make a motion at the conclusion of the

evidence.'o

Just Desserts: Conclusion

"[I]t may fairly be said, that, so soon as a man is arrested on a charge

of crime, the law takes the prisoner under its protection, and goes about

to see how his conviction may be prevented."' Elevating the standard

in determining a motion for a judgment of acquittal from prima facie to

beyond a reasonable doubt is the "forgotten" protection that a criminal

defendant deserves. Odd would be the prosecutor who would fuss about

elevating the standard. After all, the government bears the burden of

proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the

government cannot do so on its own evidence, the defendant must be not

guilty.

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法律论文优秀范文5

人民法庭多元化纠纷解决机制的构建――以曲靖市沾益区花山中心法庭为视角-法律论文-免费论文

人民法庭多元化纠纷解决机制的构建——以曲靖市沾益区花山中心法庭为视角

人民法庭多元化纠纷解决机制的构建——以曲靖市沾益区花山中心法庭为视角

摘 要: 我国社会正处于经济变革转型阶段，大量新型矛盾、纠纷涌入法庭，基层法庭应接不暇，突出表现为“案多人少”，因此，在司法改革进程中探索基层人民法庭多元化纠纷解决机制很有必要。以曲靖市沾益区花山中心法庭为例，分析基层人民法庭多元化纠纷解决机制的功能，对人民法庭多元化纠纷机制构建提出设想。

关键词: 人民法庭; 多元化纠纷

在我国法治建设过程中，与现有法律体系的完善、法律文化构建等方面相比，司法是与人民日常工作、生活联系最为紧密的。人民法庭作为基层法院的派出机构，虽然是司法改革最微小的单位，但却发挥着重要而独特的作用，其工作质量的好坏对法院的整体工作有直接的影响。不断产生的基层民事纠纷，使传统的诉讼外纠纷解决方式与当下人民生活的需要已经不相适应，大量的纠纷涌入人民法庭，法官超负荷的工作现状，使人们更多地将多元化纠纷解决机制及其构建作为推进司法改革的重要立足点。为了了解花山法庭目前的纠纷解决机制是否有效，以及需要如何来完善法庭的多元化解决纠纷机制，笔者对此做了调研。

一、花山法庭多元化解决纠纷机制概况

花山法庭位于云南省曲靖市沾益区花山街道境内，地处云南最大的煤化工业园区内，为沾益区人民法院唯一一个派出乡镇法庭。法庭辖5个乡镇，67个村委会，440个村民小组，689个自然村，辖区总面积1710平方公里，人口21万余人，近三年年平均收案800余件。收案在2017年、2018年均达到负增长。笔者通过对花山法庭近三年涉及多元化纠纷解决情况进行专项调研，梳理出以下特点:

（一）依托司法体制改革和司法责任制明确庭内多元化纠纷解决责任分配

法庭按照1＋1＋1”模式推行责任制工作，组建由法官、法官助理和书记员组成的审判团队，以及其他人员组成的包括登记立案、诉前工作、庭前准备等职责在内的综合保障团队。

综合保障团队履行以下有关多元化纠纷解决的职责：1.运用多元化纠纷机制，运作好人民调解、行政调解、司法调解的对接平台，完成了辖区内的司法确认案件；2.做好立案前的法律释明工作，联动相关 或行政部门给予人民调解或行政调解；3.运用委托调解、指定调解平台做好诉前及庭前调解工作。

（二）内部协作，灵活运用多元化纠纷解决机制

综合保障团队根据双方意愿，及时确定提前调解和速裁方案，力求做到案件交接审判组前完成1／3以上的调撤率和速裁率。案件交接审判团队时，综合保障组应及时向审判组交换案件信息，包括当事双方争议的焦点及各自底线和主观意图，审判组认为还有可能进行调解的已开庭案件，再次移交给综合保障组进行庭后调解及法律释明。

（三）形成“网格化管理”的解决机制

法庭加强诉讼与非诉讼纠纷解决方式的有机衔接，充分发挥司法推动作用，引导社会各界积极参与，指导综治组织、人民调解组织等调解民事纠纷。“三室合一”即在基层警务室、调解室、综治室形成固定对接平台，加强同“三室”的联系和交流，并通过平台指导“三室”工作人员的业务，并与“三室”互动，相互交流信息，相互合作，形成合力，积极预防和化解社会矛盾纠纷。另外，在有条件乡镇成立诉讼服务站，在部分村级 成立诉讼服务点，法庭与辖区内各诉讼服务站（点）定点联系，法官定片定责全面对接,联同人民陪审员、调解员和诉讼信息联络员形成“三员合一”联动机制，为辖区群众提供法律咨询、就地调解、及时化解等便民服务。

( 四) 多元联动调解机制

总体来看，法庭在构建多元化解纷机制方面取得了一定成效，形成了具有一定特色、层次丰富多样的、在一定程度上能满足当地群众多元司法需求的解纷机制，但我们也要清楚地看到现有解纷机制存在的不足: 一是注重法庭附设调解和委托调解，但忽视民间调解和行政调解，当事人不能有更多解纷途径选择; 二是调解员的选聘注重社会经验、身份地位和专业知识，但忽视了调解的进行还需要调解技能、调解人伦理、职业认同感等; 三是对于非诉调解的调解协议效力，虽然通过引导当事人申请司法确认和申请法院制作调解书等方式来确保得到执行，解决当事人选择调解的后顾之忧，但要注意调解协议过多地进入强制执行无疑不符合调解的本性，特别是在达成调解协议后，为了获得执行，当事人还需申请司法确认或申请制作调解书，这无形当中又增加了法院和当事人的负担，与选择调解的初衷相违背。四是多元解纷对接机制还需进一步完善，主要存在的问题是，诉前引导有限，只是对适宜调解的纠纷引导当事人选择调解，然后由法院安排委托调解，当事人的选择受到限制。

三、法庭多元化纠纷解决机制的完善

“一个社会不断趋于和谐，构建成熟的法治社会，国家应当为不同的矛盾纠纷提供多渠道解决途径，相互协调、补充。通过司法解决纠纷的方式存在一定的局限，将全部的纠纷引入司法也不现实，应当建立健全多元化纠纷解决机制。” ［1］因此，在现有纠纷的解决方式下，笔者根据法庭多元化解决纠纷的要求，通过资料与实践分析，对其进行合理整合，未来还要从以下几个方面进一步完善人民法庭多元化纠纷解决机制。

（一）设立诉调对接平台，完善诉与非诉协调机制

在人民法庭设立调解工作室、服务窗口，邀请妇联协会组织、相关人民调解组织入驻法庭调解案件，尽可能地使“诉调对接”平台的分流、释明、协调、推广等功能得到更好的发挥。在平台设计上要考虑平台的综合服务能力，将诉讼服务、信息咨询、立案登记等功能加以融合，实现诉调对接平台建设与诉讼服务中心建设相结合。为保证“诉调对接”工作能够长期有效地进行，人民法庭应当安排专门工作人员对“诉调”工作负责，并与调解、公证等机构或组织进行合作，在诉讼服务中心等部门设立调解工作室、服务窗口。人民法庭可就类型化纠纷不定期进行业务指导，对审理的典型案例可以邀请人民调解员参与旁听，或通过其他形式提高人民调解员的业务水平，更好地解决纠纷。同时，人民法庭也要对基层行政机关就民事纠纷进行的调解予以支持，积极与行政部门、其他司法行政机关进行沟通，以期建立长期有效的信息交流、共享、沟通的合作机制。定期为调解员举办培训活动，将在基层遇到的经常性案例进行汇编汇总，给予其有效的指导。在其他民间调解组织参与到较为复杂的纠纷时，人民法庭可以及时提供相关法律解析，依法提供相关调解意见。

（二）有选择实行诉前强制调解

所谓诉前强制调解是指当事人将特定类型纠纷诉诸法院之后，法院在正式受理案件之前，将案件交由人民调解委员会或者其他组织人员进行调解。［2］ 2012 年民诉法规定了诉前调解制度，法院对适宜调解的纠纷可以在诉讼前进行调解。但由于“适宜调解”过于原则，且法律也没有对诉前调解区分任意调解和强制调解，因此司法实务中，诉前调解没有得到有效利用。当前在大量矛盾纠纷涌入法院的情形下，需要充分发挥诉前调解的分流作用。除了可以通过法律指导引导当事人主动选择调解外，还可以根据纠纷繁简、金额大小等情况来决定是否适用诉前强制调解。目前已有省市规定了诉前强制调解，如《北京法院立案阶段多元调解工作的规定》第八条关于适用案件范围的规定明确了诉讼标的额10 万元以下的民间借贷纠纷适用立案前调解前置程序。（注）

（三）运用综合措施，提高多元纠纷解决效率

法院内外相关制度的完善是法院确立多元化纠纷解决机制的保障，也是提高解纷效能的关键。因此，就内部考核机制而言，对法官的考核标准应当做适当调整，不能再单纯地以结案数量作为法官考核的基本依据，而应当将法官指导、培训、引导人民调解以及培训调解人员，或是非诉调解组织申请进行个案协助的工作都应适当纳入考核范围。同时，逐步完善速裁机制，充分发挥基层人民法庭的优势，快速审理、快速调解、快速裁决的职能作用。另外，可适当延长审理期限，在纠纷双方当事人申请庭外和解，且法院对其和解活动进行委托调解或协助调解时，可以规定将庭外调解的时间不纳入审理期限，对原限定期限内未达成调解经法定程序延长期限的，所延长期限也可不计入审限。

四、结语

多元化解决纠纷机制的构建并不是一朝一夕可以完成的，这必然是个复杂而长期的过程，其中需要政府和社会力量的共同努力，也需要不断总结经验不断尝试新做法。要把多元化纠纷解决机制看成开放体系，所有能有效解决纠纷的机制均可以纳入，而不限于本文所述的调解、仲裁和诉讼。笔者期待不久的将来花山法庭多元化纠纷解决机制更加丰富完善，为中国多元化纠纷解决机制的建设做出一份贡献。

注：诉前强制调解在实践中被赋予多种术语表述，如“调解前置主义”等被当作诉前强制调解的同义语。( 参见王福华《论诉前强制调解》，《上海交通大学学报( 哲学社会科学版) 》， 2010 第2 期第19－27 页) 可见《北京法院立案阶段多元调节工作的规定》里规定的“调解前置程序”指的就是诉前强制调解。

参考文献：

［1］公丕祥． 健全多元化矛盾纠纷解决机制［J］．江苏法制报，2008( 3) : 79．

［2］肖建国，黄忠顺．诉前强制调解论纲［J］．法学论坛， 2010， 25( 6) : 38－45．

 

  

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【探析】职务侵占罪之疑难杂症-法律论文-免费论文

【探析】职务侵占罪之疑难杂症

【探析】职务侵占罪之疑难杂症

职务侵占罪是财产型犯罪中较为常见的罪名，根据《中华人民共和国刑法》第二百七十一条规定，职务侵占罪是指公司、企业或者其他单位的人员，利用职务上的便利，将本单位财物非法占为己有，数额较大的行为。国有公司、企业或者其他国有单位中从事公务的人员和国有公司、企业或者其他国有单位委派到非国有公司、企业以及其他单位从事公务的人员有前款行为的，依照本法第三百八十二条、第三百八十三条的规定定罪处罚。经过多年的司法实践和理论研讨，先前很多疑难问题已得到解决，但随着社会的发展，又产生了很多新的司法疑难问题。除了即存的本罪与他罪的认定问题，2016年颁布的《关于办理贪污贿赂刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释》因提高了职务侵占罪的数额标准，导致了新的司法实践疑难问题的出现。本文从职务侵占罪的构成要件以及量刑标准等方面，结合案例，对上述问题进行探析。

一、对“财产所有权”的探析

本罪的客体要件为公司、企业或者其他单位的财产所有权。其中，“公司”是按照《公司法》规定设立的非国有的有限责任公司和股份有限公司；所称“企业”，是指除上述公司以外的非国有的经过工商行政管理机关批准设立的有一定数量的注册资金及一定数量的从业人员的营利性的经济组织，如商店、工厂、饭店、宾馆及各种服务性行业、交通运输行业等经济组织；“其他单位“是指除上述公司、企业以外的非国有的社会团体或经济组织，包括集体或者民办的事业单位，以及各类团体。财物，包括动产和不动产。所谓“动产”，不仅指已在公司、企业、其他单位占有、管理之下的钱财（包括人民币、外币、有价证券等），而且也包括本单位有权占有而未占有的财物，如公司、企业或其他单位拥有的债权。就财物的形态而言，犯罪对象包括有形物和无形物，如厂房、电力、煤气、天然气、工业产权，等等。

需要强调的是，最高人民法院研究室于2011年2月15日对公安部经济犯罪侦查局的复函中明确指出，上述“其他单位”包括个人独资企业，成为职务侵占罪的对象，例如艺人独资成立的工作室。若艺人的经纪人利用职务之便，将客户支付给工作室的业务款占为己有，则涉嫌职务侵占罪。此外，股权也可以成为本罪的对象，但单纯利用职务便利侵占本公司股东股权的行为，不能直接认罪，除非行为人将股权所对应的财产据为己有，并将其脱离本单位的控制。随着网络时代的高速发展，手机通讯流量包也成为本罪的对象，通讯公司的职员利用职务便利，违规为自己或亲友免费办理优惠的流量包套餐，或者将优惠流量包套餐非法出售给他人，数额较大的也构成本罪。目前我国对虚拟财产还没有相应的计价方式，依照司法解释相关规定，以嫌疑人的销赃数额认定犯罪数额。

二、对“职务”的理解，区别本罪与盗窃罪

本罪的客观要件为“利用职务上的便利，侵占本单位财物，数额较大的行为”。强调了1.必须是利用自己的职务上的便利。包括（1）利用自己主管、分管、经手、决定或处理以及经办一定事项等的权力；（2）依靠、凭借自己的权力去指挥、影响下属或利用其他人员的与职务、岗位有关的权限；（3）依靠、凭借权限、地位控制、左右其他人员，或者利用对己有所求人员的权限。仅是利用工作上的便利如熟悉环境、容易混入现场、易接近目标等，即使取得了财物，也不是构成本罪，构成犯罪的，应当以他罪如盗窃罪论处。

公报案例上海市李某职务侵占案中，一审、二审法院皆认为，普通货物运输的承运人不仅负有将货物安全及时地送达目的地的职责，同时对该货物负有直接保管的义务。货运驾驶员在运输途中，利用其运输、保管货物的职务便利窃取货物的行为，构成职务侵占罪，而非盗窃罪。公报案例河南杨某盗窃案，一审、二审法院皆认为，如果行为人作为电脑室人员，易于接触他人主管、管理、经手的公司电脑，或者熟悉作案环境，但不具有管理或经受本单位财务的职责，也不管理本单位VIP积分卡充值系统的职责，仅工作中形成的便利条件秘密窃取本单位的财产，则不属于“利用职务上的便利”，以盗窃罪定罪处罚。

三、对“人员”的理解，区别本罪与贪污罪

本罪的主体要件：公司、企业或者其他单位的人员，包括如下人员：

1.股份有限公司、有限责任公司的董事、监事且不具有国家工作人员身份

2.上述公司的人员，如经理、部门负责人和其他一般职员和工人且不具有国家工作人员身份

3.上述公司以外企业或者其他单位的人员，是指集体性质企业、私营企业、外商独资企业的职工，国有企业、公司、中外合资、中外合作企业等中不具有国家工作人员身份的所有职工。

4.（1）个人独资企业的投资人，因其个人财产与企业财产是混同的，投资人占有本企业财产的一般不能构成职务侵占罪的主体，但其聘用的其他人员则可以构成职务侵占罪的主体；（2）个人合伙企业的合伙人，由于个人合伙不具有企业资格，如果合伙人其利用职务之便占有合伙企业财产，只是侵占了其他合伙人的财产，也不符合职务侵占罪的主体要求；（3）个体工商户，个体工商户不是刑法意义上的单位，实质为个人，因此，个体工商户及其聘用的人员也不能构成职务侵占罪的主体。

《刑法》第三百八十二条第二款规定：“受国家机关、国有公司、企业、事业单位、人民团体委托管理、经营国有财产的人员，利用职务上的便利，侵吞、窃取、骗取或者以其他手段非法占有国有财物的，以贪污论。”公报案例张某、黄某职务侵占案，法院认为虽然国有公司投资设立的股份公司所保管的财产可列为经手管理的国有财产，但被告人张某只是该公司雇佣的工作人员，从事的只是看管验货厂的劳务工作，其身份是一般工勤人员，对厂内货物不具有管理权力，既不属于“在公司企业或其他国有单位中从事公务的人员”，也不属于“受委托管理、经营国有财产的人员”，因此不能成为贪污罪的主体，张某利用当班看管场内货物和核对并放行车辆、代理业务员，核算员对进出货柜车进行打卡收费的职务便利，与被告黄某共同窃取储运公司负责保管的货柜应当认定为职务侵占罪。

具有国家工作人员身份的人员与公司、企业或者其他单位的人员共同侵占单位财物如何定性处理？实践中，对此有两种不同意见：一种意见是按主犯的基本特征定性，如主犯具有国家工作人员身份的，那么同案犯都定贪污罪；如主犯的身份是公司、企业或者其他单位的人员，那么具有国家工作人员身份的同案犯定侵占罪。另一种意见是：如果主犯的身份是公司、企业或者其他单位的人员，那么全案定侵占罪；如果主犯的身份是国家工作人员，应分别定罪，具有国家工作人员身份的定贪污罪，公司、企业或者其他单位的人员定侵占罪。笔者倾向于第二种意见，仅供参考。

四、对主观要件的分析，理解本罪与挪用公款罪的区别。

本罪的主观要件：直接故意，且具有非法占有公司、企业或其他单位财物的目的。即行为人妄图在经济上取得对本单位财物的占有、收益、处分的权利。至于是否已经取得或行使了这些权利，并不影响犯罪的构成。挪用本单位资金数额较大且不退还的，有可能转化为职务侵占罪。此处所说的不退还，是指挪用本单位资金，案发后人民检察院起诉前不退还。

司法实践中如何认定犯罪嫌疑人是挪用的故意还是侵占的故意？主要看被侵害的货币能否从账面上直接查出来，如果能从账面上看出，一般认定为挪用资金罪，如果无法从账面上直接查出，一般认定为职务侵占。

章某挪用资金案中，一审认为，被告人章某无论采用虚构或是截留的方法，均是将单位钱款套出后予以赌博花用，其将本单位钱款提出均有账可循，并未将账目做平，无法证明章某具有非法占有侵吞的主观故意；且章某目前无力归还钱款也不是推断章某非法占为己有的依据，故应认定章某构成挪用资金罪。二审对罪名重新认定，二审认定，章某利用担任公司市场部经理的职务便利，采用虚构业务及收款不入账等方法，将公司钱款共计人民币1,042万余元用于赌博及个人花用，不能归还。章某虽没有采用做假账的方式将账目做平用以掩盖其截留本单位钱款的行为，但章某明知没有偿还的经济能力，利用职务便利截留本单位巨额钱款用于赌博等高风险活动，客观上亦没有归还，应认定章某具有非法占有钱款的故意，构成职务侵占罪。

五、本罪定罪量刑标准调整产生的影响

于2016年4月18日起施行的《关于办理贪污贿赂刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释对本罪的定罪量刑标准作出了大幅调整，将“数额较大”的起点由原来的5000元至1万元调整为 6 万元，“数额巨大”的起点调整为100万元。《解释》的施行提高了本罪的入罪门槛，由此造成了职务侵占罪与盗窃罪在定罪量刑标准上的巨大差距：盗窃罪数额较大的起点为

1000元至 3000元，与职务侵占罪入罪标准相比，后者是前者的20至60倍。另外，数额加重犯（数额巨大）的起点也相差巨大，盗窃罪数额在3万元至10万以上属于数额巨大，处三年以上十年以下有期徒刑，盗窃数额在30万元至50万元以上属于数额特别巨大，处十年以上有期徒刑或者无期徒刑。而职务侵占罪的数额巨大起点为 100 万元，法定刑为五年以上十五年以下有期徒刑。相比之下也是数倍的差距。因而如何准确地对行为定性，就显得尤为重要。

新标准亦不利于保护单位财产。以往的司法尺度在界分职务侵占罪与盗窃罪时，总是扩张适用职务侵占、缩小盗窃罪的适用。如果继续采取既往标准，将上述公司、企业或者其他单位的人员，利用职务或工作便利实施的窃取行为统一认定为职务侵占罪，将会导致公司、企业等单位财产得不到有力保护。因为职务侵占罪的定罪门槛过高，而公司、企业，特别中小企业，很少有“内盗”数额达到 6 万元以上的，数额没有达到 6 万元就不构成犯罪，对这些侵财行为不能定罪处罚。这样将造成刑事法网漏洞，不利于对公司、企业等单位财产的依法保护。

六、目前实践中对本罪量刑的规定及侧重点

2017年，最高人民法院关于实施修订后的《关于常见犯罪的量刑指导意见》的通知关于本罪做出如下规定：1.（1）达到数额较大起点的，可以在二年以下有期徒刑、拘役幅度内确定量刑起点。（2）达到数额巨大起点的，可以在五年至六年有期徒刑幅度内确定量刑起点。2. 在量刑起点的基础上，可以根据职务便占数额等其他影响犯罪构成的犯罪事实增加刑罚量，确定基准刑。且会综合考虑职务侵占数额、次数、是否退缴赃款等因素。实践中，安徽、上海等地对于吸毒/赌博/行贿/走私等行为有增加基准刑的规定。

七、结论

“罪行规范的实质是法益保护规范，刑法的任务和目的是保护法益，因此他将侵犯法益的行为类型化成犯罪构成，并针对符合犯罪构成的行为，规定法律后果，从而形成了罪行规范。违反罪行规范的行为，就是侵犯法益的行为，对侵犯法益的行为宣示刑罚，对侵犯法益的犯罪行为科处刑罚，正是为了并实现这法益保护的目的。”通过对职务侵占罪犯罪构成要件的探析，区分本罪与他罪的基础上，结合量刑标准处罚，才能真正实现对法益的保护。

 

  

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《职工探亲待遇的规定》在当前实施中的思考-法律论文-免费论文

《职工探亲待遇的规定》在当前实施中的思考

 1981年3月14日，国务院发布了《关于职工探亲待遇的规定》（国发〔1981〕36号），以下简称《职工探亲规定》，该规定在当前企业的实践中面临越来越多的矛盾和困惑，笔者拟从探亲假制度的目的、适用对象、适用条件、实施过程中面临的问题等几个方面进行分析和思考，同时建议能对该规定进行重新修订纳入其它相关现行休假法规中或直接给予废止。

一.国家出台《职工探亲规定》的目的

 《职工探亲规定》第一条规定：“为了适当地解决职工同亲属长期远居两地的探亲问题，特制定本规定”；第二条规定：“凡在国家机关、人民团体和全民所有制企业，事业单位工作满一年的固定职工，与配偶不住在一起，又不能在公休假日团聚的，可以享受本规定探望配偶的；与父亲、母亲都不住在一起，又不能在公休假日团聚的，可以享受本规定探望父母待遇。但是，职工与父亲或与母亲一方能够在公休假日团聚的，不能享受本规定探望父母的待遇。”

 由此可见，探亲假制度的目的是通过给予符合条件的职工相应的探亲假待遇，来解决职工同亲属长期远居两地的探亲问题所设计的一项制度，是为了解决职工同亲属长期远居两地所产生的探亲问题。

二.《职工探亲规定》的适用对象

根据《职工探亲规定》，可享受探亲制度的只适用于特定的单位和职工：

 （一）特定的单位

 1.《职工探亲规定》第二条规定适用于国家机关、人民团体和全民所有制企业、事业单位等4类特定单位，既不适用于外资、台港澳、民营等其他类型企业，也不适用于《劳动合同法》及实施条例中列举的个体工商户、民办非企业、律师事务所、会计事务所、基金会等其他类型用人单位。

 2.以上适用的4类特定单位中，对于人民团体和全民所有制企业从目前单位类型来看，不能简单的等同于现在通常所说的社会团体和国有企业，具体分析如下：

 1）目前，我国对人民团体并无法律界定，一般认为人民团体属于政治概念的范畴，1989年10月国务院制定出台了《社会团体登记管理条例》，该条例表述社会团体是指“中国公民自愿组成，为实现会员共同意愿，按照其章程开展活动的非营利性社会组织。”并将参加中国人民政治协商会议的人民团体：“工会、共青团、妇联、科协、侨联、台联、青联、工商联等8个单位”排除在社会团体的范畴之外，可见，人民团体和社会团体的范围并不完全相同，探亲假制度仅适用于人民团体。

 2）关于“全民所有制”和“国有”的关系，根据《中华人民共和国宪法》第七条：“国有经济，即社会主义全民所有制经济，是国民经济中的主导力量。国家保障国有经济的巩固和发展。”第九条规定：“矿藏、水流、森林、山岭、草原、荒地、滩涂等自然资源，都属于国家所有，即全民所有。”可见，“全民所有制”在概念上基本等同于“国有”，但是，是否能够就此认为，全民所有制企业就是国有企业划呢？笔者查阅了相关资料，也不完全等同。

 2003年时，国家统计局在给公安部回函中（《关于对国有公司企业认定意见的函》（国统函[2003]44号）），将国有企业的划分标准分为广义、狭义两类。狭义的国有企业，仅指纯国有企业,包括国有独资企业、国有独资公司和国有联营企业三种形式，企业的资本金全部为国家所有。

 广义的国有企业是指具有国家资本金的企业，可分为三个层次：第一层次为狭义的国有企业；第二层次为国有控股企业。包括国有绝对控股和国有相对控股两种形式。第三层次为国有参股企业。是指具有部分国家资本金，但国家不控股的企业。国有与其他所有制的联营企业，按照上述原则分别划归第2、3层次中。

 在《职工探亲规定》出台的20世纪80年代初期，我国并没有国有控股企业、国有参股企业和国有公司的说法，因此《职工探亲规定》所调整的全民所有制企业，从当时的制度背景看，应该是指纯的国有企业。

 （二）特定的职工

 根据《职工探亲规定》，探亲制度适用的职工是在单位工作满一年的固定职工，而固定职工与现在所说的劳动合同制职工是两个不同的概念。

 固定工制度曾经是我国计划经济时期长期实行的用工制度，在这种用工制度下，职工的工作由国家分配，职工的工作期限没有规定，就业后长期在一个单位内从事生产和工作，职工一般不能离职，单位一般也不能辞退，工资待遇和劳保福利是根据国家的统一规定给予，劳动力基本不流动。

 80年代起，为解决国营企业存在的“大锅饭”、“铁饭碗”等弊病，调动企业和职工的积极性和主动性，国家开始逐步改革国营企业用工制度，1981年10月，中央首次提出“要实行合同工、临时工、固定工等多种形式的用工制度，逐步做到人员能进能出。”1983年开始，国家逐步加大劳动合同制的推进力度，从最初在新招人员中试点合同制，到1986年明确对所有新招人员都必须实行劳动合同制，再到1992年试点推行全员劳动合同制，直至1995年《劳动法》的出台，开始对所有劳动者全面推行劳动合同制。

 从上所述，劳动合同制度的建立是我国改革劳动力市场，探索市场经济劳动用工制度的成果，劳动合同制下的职工与传统的固定工存在很大区别，前者完全是市场化的，而后者更类似于如今体制内的职工，而《职工探亲规定》出台时，除了少量外资企业，我国当时尚没有真正意义上的劳动合同制职工，探亲假制度调整的对象仅指固定职工。

三.《职工探亲规定》的适用条件

 根据《职工探亲规定》，探亲假制度适用于“职工与配偶或者父母不住在一起，且不能在公休假日团聚的”情形。其中，“不能在公休假日团聚”是指不能利用公休假日在家居住一夜和休息半个白天。上述情形规定可以推导出二个条件要求：一是职工与配偶或者父母不住在一起；二是职工与配偶或者父母不能利用公休假日一起在家居住一夜和休息半个白天，这二个条件缺一不可。

 所谓公休假日，一般指职工工作满一个工作周以后的休息时间。建国后，我国长期以来实行的是“单休日制度”，即职工每周做六天休息一天。1994年实施的《国务院关于职工工作时间的规定》开始推行单双周制度，规定企业单位根据具体情况，可将每两周中的两个半天休息时间调换为一天休息。随后，1995年5月1日起《国务院关于修改<国务院关于职工工作时间的规定>的决定》改“单双周制度”为“双休日制度”，规定了国家机关、事业单位实行统一的工作时间，星期六和星期日为周休息日。企业和不能实行前款规定的统一工作时间的事业单位，可以根据实际情况灵活安排周休息日。

四.探亲制度问题分析

 1.探亲假制度只适用于特定的单位和职工，前文已述。在目前市场经济条件下的劳动力市场中，符合适用探亲假制度主体要求的群体所占比例已经很低，适用探亲假制度的群体主要集中在机关、事业单位、人民团体、纯国有企业内的一些所谓“体制内职工”，制度的适用应当是公平公正的，探亲假制度由于其适用范围的限制，可能造成只有少数群体才能够享受该权益的“歧视性”规定，容易引发社会矛盾。

 2.《职工探亲规定》出台时，我国实行的是固定工制度，职工基本没有择业自主权，也无法自由流动，容易造成职工与配偶或者父母不住在一起的情况。因此，有必要对职工在亲情上的损失进行相应的补偿。而在劳动合同制情况下，劳动者不仅拥有完全的择业自主权，而且入职后，法律还赋予了劳动者最大的权利，即劳动者只要提前30天通知用人单位，无需任何理由即可以解除劳动合同，这种“进”、“出”单位的充分自由给予劳动合同制职工与配偶或父母居住在一起创造了更加便利的客观条件。

 当然，在现实生活中，虽然也存在职工与配偶或父母分离的现象，如迁徙择业造成的农民工与家属的长期分居问题，子女在异地大学毕业后自愿留在当地就业等情况，但这种情况属于市场化用工制度下自主择业的伴生问题，这与因特定制度背景所产生被动分离现象并不一样，而且，我国的公休假日制度从《职工探亲规定》出台时的“单休”到现在的“双休”，仅这一点，职工可以利用与亲属团聚的公休假日时间多出了一倍。

同时，随着国家带薪年休假制度的实施，使《职工探亲规定》的功能基本失去了存在的意义。首先，《职工探亲规定》出台时，我国尚未实行年休假制度，职工可以享受的假期非常有限。而自从2008年1月1日《职工带薪年休假条例》实施后。我国的职工带薪年休假有了法律保障，职工不仅可以选择用年休假与配偶和父母团聚，还可以用于其他休闲目的，可以说，年休假制度较之纯粹探亲目的而制定的探亲假制度，给予了职工安排休息时间更大的灵活性和方便性。

3.从目前国家规定的职工休假日来看：第一，《职工探亲规定》出台时，我国法定假日制度仍然执行《国务院、政务院全国年节及纪念日放假办法》(1949年)规定，即每年七天法定假日，目前，我国每年法定假日增加到十一天；第二，（根据《关于职工全年月平均工作时间和工资折算问题的通知》（劳社部发〔2008〕3号），目前全年休息日共104天，较“单休日制度”时增加一倍）；第三，年休假日增加了5天（按照职工每年可以享受的最短年休假天数计算）；每年该三项假日至少增加61天。而根据《职工探亲规定》，职工平均每年可享受的探亲假日期最长也不超过30天。职工可以享受的假期已经大大超过了探亲假的假期长度。

通过以上分析可以得出，该规定出台至今35年来，一方面国家规定的假期已经远远超过探亲假规定的假期，同时，随着我国的基础交通设施和网络的发展，如今职工回家探亲较之以往更为便利，如高铁、高速公路、航空等交通日益便捷，在客观上也基本消除了职工不能在公休假日与配偶和父母团聚的情形发生。

五.实施过程中的困惑和建议

1.从法律层面上讲，随着公司制的改革，《职工探亲规定》的全民所有制企业都已经不存在，就算现在我们把它理解为纯国有企业的概念，一方面这些性质的企业也已经越来越少，另一方面，国家也并没有进一步对该规定适用对象做出明确的解释，在实施过程中缺少依据，存在执行还是不执行两难困惑。不执行，企业也没有明确依据来解释，职工也有意见；执行，好像又不符合《职工探亲规定》的适用对象和条件要求，感到模棱两可。

2.《职工探亲规定》适用于“职工与配偶或者父母不住在一起，且不能在公休假日团聚的”情形。其中，“不能在公休假日团聚”是指不能利用公休假日在家居住一夜和休息半个白天。随着我国基础交通设施和网络的发展，如今职工回家探亲较之以往更为便利，在实际操作中，路程以火车、汽车、轮船的时间计算，还是以飞机的时间计算，如何界定？实际操作非常困难，争议较大。

 3.探亲制度适用的职工是在单位工作满一年的固定职工，而现在没有固定工概念，实施的是劳动合同制，前面已分析，具体实施不符合法规要求。

 综上分析，随着我国社会、经济、法制环境的巨大变化，无论从法律层面还是实践层面，目前国家实施的法定节假日制度、双休制度和带薪休假制度等休假制度，已经完全能够满足《职工探亲规定》的利用公休假日在家居住一夜和休息半个白天的要求，对于已经出台了35年之久的探亲假制度显然已经无法发挥其应有的作用，笔者建议对该规定国家是时候要进行重新修订纳入其它相关现行休假法规中或直接给予废止。

 

  

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法律论文优秀范文8

论房地产中介法律服务-法律论文-免费论文

论房地产中介法律服务

浅论对房地产中介服务违规行为的规制

 宁夏宁正律师事务所 姜有育

 [论文摘要]随着房地产行业的骤升，房地产中介服务机构越来越多。房地产中介服务活动的开展，促进了房地产交易专业化、规范化的发展，但由于起步晚、立法不健全，有些中介服务机构由于利益的驱动，存在许多违规操作的行为。本文拟从规范和调整中介服务行为入手，探讨中介服务违规行为的表现形式、形成原因等问题，并对中介服务违规行为的规制及立法提出相关建议，以加强立法和监管机制，严格市场准入，确立责任保险制度，保障房地产中介服务业健康、有序的发展。

[关键词] 房地产 中介服务 违规行为 规制

 目 录

一、 房地产中介违规行为的主要表现形式………………………… 第3页

（一）对不允许上市交易的房地产违规代理、挂牌出售……………第3页

（二）疏于核查客户、房屋的关键信息………………………………第3页

（三）隐瞒影响交易成功的重要信息…………………………………第3页

（四）为交易双方规避法律出谋划策…………………………………第3页

（五）违规获取额外利益………………………………………………第4页

（六）资金监管存在漏洞………………………………………………第4页

二、 房地产中介违规行为成因分析………………………………… 第4页

（一）立法层级低、缺乏可操作性，致使规制房地产中介难以做到有法可依…………………………………… 第4页

（二）市场准入门槛太低，人员素质普遍不高。………………… 第4页（三）监督检查执行不到位，也是问题突出、屡禁不止的重要原因 第5页

三、规制房地产中介违规行为的几点建议……………………………第5页（一）严格市场准入并建立等级评定制………………………………第5页（二）设立行业协会……………………………………………………第5页（三）确立过错归责原则和中介机构的免责事由……………………第5页（四）建立中介行业保证金制度和责任保险制度……………………第6页

（五）定期组织培训和考核，提高中介机构和人员素质……………第6页

浅论对房地产中介服务违规行为的规制

近几年来，随着房地产行业的不断升温，房地产市场空前活跃，房地产中介服务机构如雨后春笋般纷纷涌现。一方面，中介机构为房地产交易的供求双方起到了媒介和桥梁的作用，促进了房地产交易的专业化、规范化运作；另一方面，由于我国房地产中介服务起步较晚，立法也不够健全，房地产中介服务行为混乱无序，侵害当事人权益、欺诈消费者事件时有发生。鉴于此，迅速规范房地产中介行为、平衡当事人之间的利益，已成为我国立法必须面对的迫切问题。本文拟从规范和调整中介行为入手，探讨中介违规行为的表现形式、形成原因等问题，并对中介违规行为的规制及立法提出相关建议。

一、 房地产中介违规行为的主要表现形式

根据《城市房地产管理法》及《城市房地产中介服务管理规定》的有关规定，所谓房地产中介服务，是指房地产咨询、房地产价格评估、房地产经纪等活动的总称。房地产中介服务违规行为，是指房地产中介服务机构和人员违反相关法律、法规的规定，故意或过失操作房地产咨询、价格评估和经纪等中介服务活动，扰乱房地产交易市场的正常秩序，损害房地产交易各方当事人合法权益的行为。其主要表现形式为：

（一）对不允许上市交易的房地产违规代理、挂牌出售。

根据我国《城市房地产管理法》第38条的规定，对于未依法登记领取权属证书的或具有法律和行政法规规定禁止转让的房地产不得转让。但在实践中，一些房地产中介为了促成交易，赚取佣金，往往隐瞒标的房屋仍为承租公房或为限制年限内的经济适用住房等不能上市交易的事实，或随意承诺短期内即可解决交易障碍，致使买卖双方在随后交易失败后与房地产中介公司就中介费应否支付产生纷争。

（二）疏于核查客户、房屋的关键信息。

如中介公司未对客户出示的身份证明、房屋权属证明进行合理查验；未仔细审查待售房屋有无抵押、有无出租及私搭乱建，并核查委托的客户是否是真正有权出售房屋的权利人；对于属于夫妻共有财产的房屋，未要求配偶一方出具同意出售和委托办理的证明；对于待出售房屋为遗产的，未要求全体遗产继承人出具同意出售的书面委托文件。

（三）隐瞒影响交易成功的重要信息。

如不向买受人如实说明其已知的可能不利于成交的待售房屋的历史情况或周边环境或必要生活设施情况。

（四）为交易双方规避法律出谋划策。

如承诺为无实力购房人办理“高评低供”还贷款手续，或帮助外地买受人虚构在京纳税或社保缴费一年以上证明，或为迎合买受人少交税款的心理帮助买卖双方签订“阴阳合同”，恶意促成双方达成不平等或不合法交易。

（五）违规获取额外利益。

如中介公司要求买受人全程通过其交纳钱款、委托办理过户，从而千方百计阻挠买受人与出卖人见面，再通过隐瞒房屋真实成交价、一再加价等手段将多收取的售房款据为己有。又如中介公司怂恿当事人采取恶意毁约、一房二卖的方式高价出售房产以为自身获取更高的居间服务费，从而引发房屋买卖连环纠纷。

（六）资金监管存在漏洞。

大部分交易中，买卖合同约定的定金和首付款由中介公司自行监管，有的交易总价较高，定金和首付款的总和可能高达几十万元，这大大增加了交易风险；一些银行只对在该银行贷款的购房客户实行免费资金监管，而对于不在该银行贷款的购房客户不提供资金监管服务或收取高额的监管服务费用，导致购房客户不愿或无法选择由第三方办理资金监管。

二、 房地产中介违规行为成因分析

（一）立法层级低、缺乏可操作性，致使规制房地产中介难以做到有法可依。

在国家立法层面，目前我国尚无专门的房地产中介管理立法，仅有的几个条文只散见于《城市房地产管理法》第58条(有关房地产中介服务机构的设立条件)及《合同法》第23章(有关居间合同的一般规定)中，并不足以起到规范现实生活中复杂多样的房地产中介行为的作用。而建设部颁布的《城市房地产中介服务管理规定》、国家工商总局颁布的《经纪人管理办法》、国家计委和建设部联合发布的《关于房地产中介服务收费的通知》及建设部和财政部等七部委联合下发的《关于整顿和规范房地产市场秩序的通知》等均属于部委规章和文件，难以被法院直接引用，这就在一定程度上弱化了法律对市场的宣示功能，并助长了房地产中介机构漠视法规、不时突破甚至违法乱纪的行为。

 

而且，有关房地产中介方面的管理规范多系指引性和框架性的规定，缺乏一些必要的明确指引和具体要求。如在房地产中介机构的设立条件上，无论是《城市房地产管理法》还是《城市房地产中介服务管理规定》均只要求有必要的财产和经费，但何为“必要”却未进一步规定，这就意味着只要符合《公司法》规定的下限即人民币10万元即可登记注册一家房地产经纪公司，无疑这样的条件设计对于经手大量交易、可能会给客户造成巨大经济损失的房地产中介企业而言未免过于宽泛了。

（二）市场准入门槛太低，人员素质普遍不高。

我国房地产从业人员的执业准入也相当宽松，不仅学历要求低，而且考试也简单，造成房地产中介从业人员良莠不齐，缺乏必要的敬业精神和职业道德素养，埋下了诸多隐患。

（三）监督检查执行不到位，也是问题突出、屡禁不止的重要原因。

根据《经纪人管理办法》第18条的规定，对经纪人的违法活动，工商行政管理机关有权按照有关法律法规及行政规章予以处罚。但事实上，每年房地产中介虽然占据经纪类投诉的首位，却鲜见有职能机关监督检查、处罚违规中介的报道。

在美国，由私人推动组建有贯通上下的全美房地产经纪人协会、州协会和市协会这样一套金字塔状、网络化的格局建制，如入会会员有任何违纪行为，协会即有权吊销其相应资格甚至对其提起诉讼。但在我国，目前并未建立起全国性的房地产经纪协会组织，一些地方也尚未组建区域性的房地产经纪协会，已经建立的地区性经纪协会在会员数量、服务培训、管理手段上均表现得相当疲软。

三、规制房地产中介违规行为的几点建议

要解决房地产中介违规行为带来的诸多问题，唯一标本兼治的办法就是加强和完善立法。建议立法应确立以下几方面内容：

（一）严格市场准入并建立等级评定制。

国外对房地产中介机构及其执业人员一般都实行严格的准入制度，如美国的执照制度和我国香港地区的发牌制度，都严格限制入市机构和人员的标准和条件。近几年，我国虽然也实行中介机构资质及执业人员资格管理制度，但由于标准及条件规定偏宽，且监管机构把关不严，导致大量的低素质机构及执业人员进入市场。为此，我国要通过立法对从业机构和人员分别实行严格的准入标准，建立中介公司等级评定制，推动中介市场优胜劣汰，并为购房者提供区分良莠的依据。

（二）设立行业协会

许多发达国家和地区都建立了房地产中介行业协会，并通过行业协会制订了执业道德规范，对中介违规行为加以规范和限制。行业协会可配合政府有关部门对不正当的中介行为进行处罚，如在本行业内部公告严重违规或严重缺乏资信的中介机构或人员名单，禁止其在一定期限内重新执业以及开除出协会等等。

（三）确立过错归责原则和中介机构的免责事由

过错责任是指因行为过错导致他人损害时应承担的责任。根据客观过错说，行为人的行为只要违反了法律所设定的规则、义务，那么即存在过错。在房地产中介服务中，中介机构从事违规行为一般都出于过错和重大过失。鉴于中介违规行为的特殊性，为避免诉讼中受害方对中介机构的主观过错举证困难，应适用过错推定原则，实行举证倒置。只要中介服务给当事人带来损失，当事人就可以起诉中介机构，中介机构必须提供证据证明自己主观无过错或过失，否则就应当推定其有过错，应当对受害方的损害承担责任。

（四）建立中介行业保证金制度和责任保险制度。

为防止中介机构及从业人员挪用客户资金或携款潜逃，相关主管部门应推动建立中介行业保证金制度和责任保险制度，以保障整个房产中介行业的良性发展。保证金指房地产中介机构缴纳，用于保障房地产中介行业中消费者权益的专用款项。也可以借鉴我国旅游业明确规定的旅行社质量保证金制度，建立房地产中介行业的保证金制度。设置房地产中介行业责任险，使作为被保险人的房地产中介机构在承办房屋中介业务过程中因过失给委托人及其利害关系人造成的损失，可由保险公司在赔偿限额内负责赔偿，这有利于保障安全交易和当事人的合法权益。

（五）定期组织培训和考核，提高中介机构和人员素质。负责监管房地产中介机构的行政部门应定期组织培训，及时传达有关房地产中介行为操作规范的法律法规，通报具有违规行为的中介机构和业务人员以及采取的处罚措施，以起到警诫作用，从而树立中介机构和个人的诚信意识。同时，还应加强对中介机构高层的培训，树立中介机构的危机意识，引导中介机构从无序扩张、寅吃卯粮的发展状态逐渐向理性判断市场走势、维护市场稳定健康发展的方向发展

 

  

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